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In July 2018, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ran
a sample of photos depicting members of the 115th United States
Congress through Amazon’s “Rekognition” software,1 a software
designed to provide “highly accurate facial analysis, face
comparison, and face search capabilities,” among other services. 2
The ACLU compared the congressional members’ photos to a
database of 25,000 publicly available arrest photos.3 Despite none
of the congressional members actually being depicted in the arrest
photo database, Amazon’s Rekognition software found twenty-eight
matches between the congressional members’ photos and the
mugshots in the database.4 Upon human examination, it was clear
these twenty-eight matches were caused by mistakes in the
Rekognition software.5 Frighteningly, the twenty-eight mismatches
were disproportionally people of color.6 Despite attaining some of
the most honorable positions in the nation, these Congressional
Members were confused with criminals.7
In recent years, Facial Recognition Technology (FRT), like
Amazon’s Rekognition, has become increasingly popular in a
variety of industries.8 FRT is revolutionizing many activities that
require a form of identification or verification.9 For example, FRT is
1. Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of
Congress with Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28
[perma.cc/PL69-FWQL].
2. What is Amazon Rekogniton?, AMAZON, https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rekog
nition/latest/dg/what-is.html [perma.cc/WHQ4-R55R].
3. Snow, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. (“Nearly 40 percent of Rekognition’s false matches in our test were of
people of color, even though they make up only 20 percent of [the 115th United
States] Congress.”).
7. Id.
8. See Facial Recognition: Top 7 Trends (Tech, Vendors, Markets, Use Cases,
and Latest News), THALES (Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/
markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/biometrics/facial-recognition
[perma.cc/89ME-RW34].
9. See, e.g., Sintia Radu, The Technology That’s Turning Heads, U.S. NEWS
(July
26,
2019),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/
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now a crucial part of how social media companies identify users in
photos, how people unlock their phones, and how plane passengers
check in to their flight.10 The recent proliferation of FRT is due to a
major boom in artificial intelligence and, specifically, machine
learning.11 Although the increased use of this novel technology may
seem exciting and convenient, machine learning systems have been
found to harbor forms of bias that can maintain and often increase
inequalities.12 FRT is no exception to this frightening trend of
“algorithmic bias,” which is defined as systematic errors in a
computer program that lead to unfair outcomes.13 FRT manifests
bias through a substantially better identification rate for faces with
lighter skin and faces that exhibit traditionally-male facial features
than faces with darker skin and faces that exhibit traditionallyfemale facial features.14
FRT’s algorithmic bias can be an offensive annoyance when it
mistakenly tags people of color as other people 15 or categorizes
people of color as inhuman species,16 but these algorithmic mistakes
2019-07-26/growing-number-of-countries-employing-facial-recognition-technology
[https://perma.cc/N9QZ-2CNA].
10. Id.
11. Nick Statt, The AI Boom Is Happening All Over the World, and It’s
Accelerating Quickly, VERGE (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/
2018/12/12/18136929/artificial-intelligence-ai-index-report-2018-machine-learningglobal-progress-research [perma.cc/M2XW-2FQ7].
12. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 3 (2016) (“The mathpowered applications powering the data economy were based on choices made by
fallible human beings. Some of these choices were no doubt made with the best
intentions. Nevertheless, many of these models encoded human prejudice,
misunderstanding, and bias into the software systems that increasingly managed
our lives. Like gods, these mathematical models were opaque, their working invisible
to all but the highest priests in their domain: mathematicians and computer
scientists. Their verdicts, even when wrong or harmful, were beyond dispute or
appeal. And they tend to punish the poor and the oppressed in our society, while
making the rich richer.”).
13. See Nicol Turner Lee, Paul Resnick & Genie Barton, Algorithmic Bias
Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices and Policies to Reduce Consumer Harms,
BROOKINGS INST. (May 22, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmicbias-detection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumerharms/ [https://perma.cc/97L9-F2YS].
14. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy
Disparities in Commercial Gender Classifications, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING
RESCH.
71,
88
(2018),
http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/
buolamwini18a.pdf [perma.cc/D24E-9JK6].
15. See TED, How I’m Fighting Bias in Algorithms | Joy Buolamwini, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UG_X_7g63rY [perma.cc/SGC2X3L3].
16. For example, in 2015:
Google came under fire this week after its new Photos app categorized
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become a matter of life and liberty when considering law
enforcement agencies’ increased reliance on FRT in identifying
suspects.17 FRT’s utility for law enforcement is undeniable. 18 With
FRT, law enforcement can cross-reference camera footage showing
a criminal suspect with their database of mugshots and other
possible photo databases to identify the suspect.19 However, law
enforcement’s increased use of FRT, combined with FRT’s
demonstrated algorithmic bias, may lead to a stream of
disproportionate misidentifications that are deemed correct due to
the perception that FRT is “objective.”20 Due to the potential
photos in one of the most racist ways possible. On June 28th, computer
programmer Jacky Alciné found that the feature kept tagging pictures of
him and his girlfriend as “gorillas.”
....
. . . Nikon and other consumer camera companies have also had a history
of showing bias to white faces with their facial recognition software. Zunger
says that Google has had similar issues with facial recognition due to
inadequate analysis of skin tones and lighting.
Loren Grush, Google Engineer Apologizes After Photos App Tags Two Black People
as Gorillas, VERGE (July 1, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/2015/7/1/
8880363/google-apologizes-photos-app-tags-two-black-people-gorillas
[perma.cc/MQD3-2ZEQ].
17. FRT adds an additional layer where discrimination can occur in law
enforcement:
[A] demographic group that is underrepresented in benchmark datasets can
nonetheless be subjected to frequent targeting. . . . False positives and
unwarranted searches pose a threat to civil liberties. Some face recognition
systems have been shown to misidentify people of color, women, and young
people at high rates (Klare et al., 2012). Monitoring phenotypic and
demographic accuracy of these systems as well as their use is necessary to
protect citizens’ rights and keep vendors and law enforcement accountable
to the public.
Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 14, at 2; see also CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO M.
BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE, GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH., THE
PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 2–4
(2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org/sites/default/files/2016-12/The Perpetual
Line-Up - Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown Law - 121616.pdf
[perma.cc/94GN-SJQ8].
18. See, e.g., Drew Harwell, Oregon Became a Testing Ground for Amazon’s
Facial-Recognition Policing. But What if Rekognition Goes Wrong?, WASH. POST
(April
30,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/
04/30/amazons-facial-recognition-technology-is-supercharging-local-police/
[perma.cc/M639-KR3M] (providing an example of how law enforcement can utilize
FRT to assist in arrests).
19. See id.
20. See Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to
Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2017) (“Both critics and
advocates can stray into uncritical deference to the idea that big data and the
algorithms used to process the data are somehow infallible science. . . . [A]lthough
algorithms are decidedly not mystical things or dark magic, algorithms are not well
understood outside the technical community.”); Nanette Byrnes, Why We Should
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disparate impact law enforcement’s use of FRT may have on
communities of color, law enforcement’s use of FRT must be
carefully scrutinized to support law enforcement’s interest in
investigative advancements while limiting the misuse of a software
that has the potential to severely injure civil liberties.
Part I of this Note will explain the basic science behind
machine learning and demonstrate how well-intended
programmers can create biased algorithms through the use of
program training material that does not represent the United
States’ diverse population. Part II of this Note will explore FRT’s
utility for police investigations, then survey various agencies’
existing protocols for the use of FRT as well as how FRT is used in
conventional practice. Part III of this Note will examine what role,
if any, existing constitutional protections and statutory provisions
can have in law enforcement use of FRT when considering concerns
of algorithmic bias. Part IV of this Note will canvass pending and
proposed legislative options for managing law enforcement’s use of
FRT and curbing algorithmic bias. Part V of this Note will analyze
the potential avenues for balancing law enforcement investigative
efforts with concerns of disparate infringement on civil liberties and
algorithmic misidentification. This Note will conclude by
encouraging legislative bodies to adopt adaptive frameworks to
constrain the concerning prospects of FRT and algorithmic bias
without crippling advancements in police investigative technology.
Part I: Facial Recognition Technology and Algorithmic
Bias
A. Facial Recognition Technology: The Basics of Machine
Learning
“Machine learning is a method of data analysis that automates
analytical model building.”21 The process begins by giving a
computer program, or algorithm, a set of test data and then
instructing it to perform a specific task with that data. 22 As the
algorithm sorts through the data in an attempt to achieve its
Expect Algorithms to Be Biased, MIT TECH. REV. (June 24, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/06/24/159118/why-we-should-expectalgorithms-to-be-biased/ [perma.cc/5HNP-KQ8T] (“[A] broader trend that Fred
Beneson, Kickstarter’s former data chief, calls ‘mathwashing’: our tendency to idolize
programs like Facebook’s as entirely objective because they have mathematics at
their core.”).
21. Machine Learning: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS, https://www.sas.com/
en_us/insights/analytics/machine-learning.html [perma.cc/5XA2-3URT].
22. Id.
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designated task, the algorithm is able to gradually perceive
patterns and categories that allow it to achieve its designated task
more efficiently.23 This process of developing patterns and
categories is the crux of machine learning. 24 Through these
patterns, a machine learning system is able to determine what
products a consumer may like due to their past purchases, who may
default on a loan based on past financial choices, and answer many
more predictive or analytical questions.25
An FRT system functions similarly to other forms of machine
learning.26 During development of an FRT system, like Amazon’s
Rekognition, the FRT system is given a set of test data—which is
composed of a series of images containing things such as scenery,
people, and other objects—and then told to sort between the faces
and the other things present in these images.27 Once the FRT
system is able to consistently distinguish faces from other objects,
then the programmers task the algorithm with distinguishing one
person’s face from another. 28 The system develops an
understanding of how different people’s facial features, their facial
shape, and various other facial attributes can help the algorithm
tell people apart.29 Eventually, the program will be able to process
new photos and compare the featured faces to those already in its
memory in order to place a name to the face. 30
B. Algorithmic Bias: How Seemingly Objective Machines
Further Inequality
A machine learning program is only as accurate as its test data
trains it to be.31 A lack of foresight from programmers can
inadvertently lead to test data either being unrepresentative of
reality or reflective of existing biases. 32 For example, in 2016,
23. Yufeng Guo, The 7 Steps of Machine Learning, MEDIUM: TOWARDS DATA SCI.
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://towardsdatascience.com/the-7-steps-of-machine-learning2877d7e5548e [perma.cc/EL7V-JLMY].
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., Desai & Kroll, supra note 20.
26. See Oleksii Kharkovyna, An Intro to Deep Learning for Face Recognition,
MEDIUM: TOWARDS DATA SCI. (June 26, 2017), https://towardsdatascience.com/anintro-to-deep-learning-for-face-recognition-aa8dfbbc51fb
[https://perma.cc/4868BUE6].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See SAS, supra note 21.
32. See Karen Hao, This Is How AI Bias Really Happens—and Why It’s So Hard

2021]

Fly in the Face of Bias

227

ProPublica examined the accuracy of a tool called COMPAS, which
has been used in determining an appropriate sentence for convicted
criminals.33 ProPublica found that COMPAS was almost twice as
likely to falsely flag Black defendants as recidivists compared to
White defendants.34 These disparities stemmed from questions the
COMPAS model used in its recidivism risk evaluation, such as:
“Was one of your parents ever sent to jail or prison?”35 By relying on
data hued by existing inequalities,36 the COMPAS system
mistakenly propagated inequalities based on supposedly raceneutral questions like parental incarceration.37
As an FRT program is learning, it is presented with test data,
which, to achieve accurate results, should feature images of diverse
faces that are representative of society.38 However, recent research
suggests FRT test data principally features lighter-skin and

to Fix, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612876/
this-is-how-ai-bias-really-happensand-why-its-so-hard-to-fix/
[perma.cc/6VE93F3S].
33. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kircher, Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-riskassessments-in-criminal-sentencing [perma.cc/3VTJ-K5GP].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Smith and Levinson describe these inequalities:
The disproportionate incarceration of minorities is one of the American
criminal justice system’s most established problems. In spite of a societal
backdrop in which descriptive claims of a ‘post-racial’ America prosper, the
problematic racial dynamics of criminal justice persist. The numbers are
stark and clear: one out of every twenty-nine black adult women and men
are currently incarcerated compared with only one out of every 194 whites.
Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 795 (2012).
Further:
[I]mplicit favoritism is important because it helps to drive racial disparities
in the criminal justice system. Social scientists have linked implicit
favoritism to the ability of jurors to accurately remember damning details
of an alleged offense, to the evaluation of whether negative actions taken by
another are the result of one’s disposition or instead to the circumstances
that constrained one’s choices, and to the degree of empathic response to
human pain. Implicit white favoritism has serious ramifications for criminal
law and procedure because it can operate in a range of powerful ways that
can be distinguished from traditional race-focused examples: in the way, for
example, white drivers are pulled over less often than unseen drivers, in the
way legislators might see white “meth” addicts as suffering from an illness
and black “crack” addicts as criminals, and in the way prosecutors and
jurors view a crime as more aggravated if the victim is white or see a white
juvenile offender to be more capable of redemption.
Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson & Zoe Robinson, Implicit White Favoritism in
the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 875–76 (2015) (footnotes omitted).
37. Angwin et al., supra note 33.
38. Kharkovyna, supra note 26.
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traditionally-male facial features.39 This leads FRT programs to not
be appropriately trained on how to identify and/or distinguish
people with darker skin or people with traditionally-female facial
features.40 This heightened error rate for people with darker skin or
people with traditionally-female facial features was likely not
noticed by programmers initially because overall FRT is very
accurate.41 It is only when an algorithm’s error rates are dissected
along demographic lines that these concerns emerge.42
Not all FRT programs exhibit the same magnitude of
demographically-based error rates.43 In December 2019, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)—a
government agency tasked with advancing measurement science,
standards, and technology44—evaluated 189 different FRT
algorithms from ninety-nine developers to see how these programs
performed across variations of race, age, and sex. 45 NIST’s study
tested the programs on both “one-to-one” matching46 and “one-to39. See Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, If You’re a White Guy, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facialrecognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html [perma.cc/MAV4-8LP8] (“A.I. software
is only as smart as the data used to train it. If there are many more white men than
black women in the system, it will be worse at identifying the black women.”).
40. For example:
LFW, a dataset composed of celebrity faces which has served as a gold
standard benchmark for face recognition, was estimated to be 77.5% male
and 83.5% White (Han and Jain, 2014). Although (Taigman et al., 2014)’s
face recognition system recently reported 97.35% accuracy on the LFW
dataset, its performance is not broken down by race or gender. Given these
skews in the LFW dataset, it is not clear that the high reported accuracy is
applicable to people who are not well represented in the LFW benchmark.
Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 14, at 3.
41. See id. at 12 (“We found that all [three gender] classifiers performed best for
lighter individuals and males overall. The classifiers performed worst for darker
females.”). In the aggregate, gender classification accuracy ranged from 87.9% to
93.7%, within marketable range. Id. at 11.
42. See Clare Garvie & Jonathan Frankle, Facial-Recognition Software Might
Have a Racial Bias Problem, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.the
atlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-underlying-bias-of-facial-recognitionsystems/476991/ [perma.cc/N2QS-K6FC].
43. See PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L I NST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART 3:
DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS 2 (2019).
44. NIST is a physical sciences laboratory and a non-regulatory agency of the
United States Department of Commerce that is tasked with advancing measurement
science, standards, and technology. See NIST Mission, Vision, Core Competencies,
and Core Values, NIST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/about-nist/ourorganization/mission-vision-values [perma.cc/7KDS-T9P7].
45. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 43, at 1.
46. NIST Study Evaluated Effects of Race, Age, Sex, on Face Recognition
Software, NIST (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/
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many” matching.47 NIST found that the majority of tested programs
exhibited a higher false positive rate across each test, meaning a
higher rate of misidentification, when the program was asked to
evaluate non-White faces and faces with traditionally-female
characteristics.48 The authors noted, “differentials in false positives
in one-to-many matching are particularly important because the
consequences could include false accusations.”49 Although some
programs exhibited a minimal error rate,50 NIST expressed a
general concern about organizations using FRT not appropriately
researching or scrutinizing the specific programs their organization
employs.51 FRT program designers have acknowledged these
problems and are working to improve them,52 but as things stand
currently, FRT programs are laced with algorithmic bias. 53
Part II: Law Enforcement’s Use of FRT: Investigative

2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software
[perma.cc/3N8U-Q49K] (describing “one-to-one” matching as “confirming a photo
matches a different photo of the same person in a database . . . [which] is commonly
used for verification work, such as unlocking a smartphone or checking a passport”).
47. Id. (describing “one-to-many” matching as “determining whether the person
in the photo has any match in a database”).
48. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 43, at 2 (noting the tested programs varied in
their false positive error rates “by factors of 10 to beyond 100 times”).
49. E.g., NIST, supra note 46.
50. MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION
FOUND., THE CRITICS WERE WRONG: NIST DATA SHOWS THE BEST FACIAL
RECOGNITION ALGORITHMS ARE NEITHER RACIST NOR SEXIST 2 (2020),
https://itif.org/publications/2020/01/27/critics-were-wrong-nist-data-shows-bestfacial-recognition-algorithms [perma.cc/MS3N-P2HE] (“[T]he most accurate
algorithms—which should be the only algorithms used in government systems—did
not display a significant demographic bias . . . . [S]ome highly accurate algorithms
had false-positive demographic differentials that were so small as to be
‘undetectable’ for one-to-many searches.”).
.
51. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 43, at 3 (“Operational implementations usually
employ a single face recognition algorithm. Given algorithm-specific variation, it is
incumbent upon the system owner to know their algorithm . . . . Since different
algorithms perform better or worse in processing images of individuals in various
demographics, policy makers, face recognition system developers, and end users
should be aware of these differences and use them to make decisions and to improve
future performance.”).
52. See Sean Hollister, Google Contractors Reportedly Targeted Homeless People
for Pixel 4 Facial Recognition, VERGE (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.the
verge.com/2019/10/2/20896181/google-contractor-reportedly-targeted-homelesspeople-for-pixel-4-facial-recognition [perma.cc/N8FH-25UN].
53. E.g., Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 14.
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Potential, Procedures, and Practices
A. FRT’s Potential for Criminal Suspect Identification
Law enforcement agencies across the United States have been
rapidly adopting FRT as a crucial part of their investigative
procedures.54 Federal, state, and local agencies have partnered with
FRT designers like Amazon, Google, and others to increase their
capabilities in identifying and tracking suspects.55 Currently, law
enforcement agencies primarily use FRT to identify suspects from
images captured by surveillance footage or by a witness’s camera,
but the uses of FRT will potentially expand in the near future.56 The
government “facial biometrics” market is expected to grow nearly
threefold within the next decade.57 Currently, at least one fourth of
state or local police departments have the ability to conduct
searches through a face recognition system.58
Law enforcement’s use of FRT is expected to revolutionize law
enforcement’s ability to identify suspects in a similar way to the
spread of forensic DNA identification in the late 1980s.59 Like DNA
evidence, FRT allows officers to take a small piece of biometric
evidence recovered from a crime scene and then cross-reference this

54. See generally Jon Schuppe, Facial Recognition Gives Police a Powerful New
Tracking Tool. It’s Also Raising Alarms., NBC NEWS (July 30, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/facial-recognition-gives-police-powerfulnew-tracking-tool-it-s-n894936
[perma.cc/8YCS-UYKG]
(discussing
law
enforcement’s use of facial recognition).
55. See id.
56. JENNIFER LYNCH, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., FACE OFF: LAW ENFORCEMENT
USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 1 (Gennie Gebhart ed., 2020) (“Today,
law enforcement officers can use mobile devices to capture face recognition-ready
photographs of people they stop on the street; surveillance cameras boast real-time
face scanning and identification capabilities; and federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies have access to hundreds of millions of images of faces of lawabiding Americans. On the horizon, law enforcement would like to use face
recognition with body-worn cameras, to identify people in the dark, to match a person
to a police sketch, or even to construct an image of a person’s face from a small sample
of their DNA.”).
57. See Jon Schuppe, How Facial Recognition Became a Routine Policing Tool in
America, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/howfacial-recognition-became-routine-policing-tool-america-n1004251 [perma.cc/4JZ52758] (“The government ‘facial biometrics’ market . . . is expected to soar from $136.9
million in 2018 to $375 million by 2025 . . . .”).
58. GARVIE ET AL., supra note 17, at 2.
59. See generally Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science
Kit: DNA Databases for 21st Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
635, 640 (2000) (discussing different DNA initiatives led by the United States
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in support of law
enforcement).
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evidence with their department’s databases to obtain a
comprehensive list of information about the target suspect.60 Unlike
DNA analysis, FRT does not require a suspect to have left some of
their bodily tissue, fluids, or other biological material at the crime
scene.61 FRT only requires an image of the suspect captured
through closed-circuit television (CCTV) or some other method.62
Already, FRT has led to the apprehension of serious criminals
that had evaded capture for months or even years. For example, in
December 2018, the York Area Regional Police Department was
able to identify a man who had electronically manipulated and
eventually sexually assaulted a fifteen-year-old girl in July 2016. 63
Despite the suspect leaving his sunglasses at the crime scene, which
were processed for DNA and fingerprints, police were unable to
identify the suspect until they finally received a match using facial
recognition software.64 After months of cross-referencing the photos
the suspect sent the victim with driver’s license photos, mugshots,
and other sources of facial identification, law enforcement found a
match. Law enforcement got a lucky break when the suspect
updated his driver’s license photo to more closely resemble how he
appeared at the time of the assault.65 The York Area Regional Police
Department’s successful location of a suspect is just one of many
examples of FRT assisting law enforcement when other methods of
identifying suspects have failed.66 FRT can greatly enhance law
60. See Schuppe, supra note 57.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Daniel Rosler, Facial Recognition Software Led to the Arrest of a Scranton
Man for Alleged Sexual Assault of Teen, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://apnews.com/article/e0a56374618840cf88e78637428d63d0 [perma.cc/Q2K3FWKD].
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Marco della Cava & Elizabeth Weise, Capital Gazette Gunman Was
Identified Using Facial Recognition Technology That’s Been Controversial, USA
TODAY
(June
29,
2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/
talkingtech/2018/06/29/capital-gazette-gunman-identified-using-facial-recognitiontechnology/744344002/ [perma.cc/XH5X-496U] (explaining law enforcement’s use of
facial identification technology “because the system for getting the identification off
his fingerprints was working slowly . . . .”); Ryan Lucas, How a Tip — and Facial
Recognition Technology — Helped the FBI Catch a Killer, NPR (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/21/752484720/how-a-tip-and-facial-recognitiontechnology-helped-the-fbi-catch-a-killer [perma.cc/BCH5-XNMH]; Amy B. Wang, A
Suspect Tried to Blend in with 60,000 Concertgoers. China’s Facial-Recognition
Cameras
Caught
Him.,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
13,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/13/china-crimefacial-recognition-cameras-catch-suspect-at-concert-with-60000-people/
[perma.cc/MZ4L-HRVP] (describing the use of FRT to track one individual at a
60,000-person event in China).
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B. Current Police Procedures and Unadvised Practices
Most agencies follow the same five-step process in using FRT
to identify a suspect.69 First, officers obtain a visual representation
of a criminal suspect.70 Second, officers prepare the visual
representation to be entered into the FRT.71 Third, the FRT
compares the visual representation with the system’s catalogue of
faces, typically composed of mugshots.72 Fourth, the FRT produces
a list of possible facial matches for an inquiring officer to review;
each match typically comes with a coinciding confidence level,
which demonstrates how certain the system is that the listed person
is the targeted suspect.73 Lastly, an officer reviews the list produced
by the FRT and determines if any of the potential matches should
be investigated further.74
Many law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) 75 and the New York Police Department

67. The use of FRT has been successful in many cases:
Recently, the work of the facial identification team led to the arrest of a man
accused of raping a worker at a day spa, and another charged with pushing
a subway passenger onto the tracks. We have made arrests in murders,
robberies and the on-air assault of a TV reporter. A woman whose
dismembered body was found in trash bags in two Bronx parks was
identified. So was a woman hospitalized with Alzheimer’s, through an old
arrest photo for driving without a license.
James O’Neill, How Facial Recognition Makes You Safer, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/opinion/facial-recognition-police-new-yorkcity.html [perma.cc/G6L2-CC6P].
68. See id. (“The software has also cleared suspects. According to the Innocence
Project, 71 percent of its documented instances of false convictions are the result of
mistaken witness identifications. When facial recognition technology is used as a
limited and preliminary step in an investigation . . . these miscarriages of justice are
less likely.”).
69. See Schuppe, supra note 57.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.; see also Matt Leonard, Why Confidence Matters in Facial Recognition
Systems, GCN (Aug. 6, 2018), https://gcn.com/Articles/2018/08/06/trust-facialrecognition.aspx?Page=1 [perma.cc/U624-34UH] (discussing the importance of
setting a high confidence threshold for FRT programs when used by law enforcement
because a program’s threshold confidence level determines the occurrence of false
positives).
74. See Schuppe, supra note 57.
75. See Facial Recognition Technology: Part II: Ensuring Transparency in
Government Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th
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(NYPD),76 treat the results of an FRT inquiry as an “investigative
lead only.”77 An “investigative lead” means officers must find
additional investigative material to reach the level of probable
cause needed for a legitimate arrest.78 However, the FBI is
currently considering dropping the “investigative lead only”
protocol and allowing an FRT match to reach the level of probable
cause based on confidence in its program and expected expansion.79
Other law enforcement agencies, like Oregon’s Washington County
Police Department, will only run a facial recognition search after
establishing probable cause that a crime has been committed in
order to locate the specific perpetrator.80
Although there are currently some discrepancies in procedures
related to FRT, there appears to be even larger discrepancies
between field usage of FRT and best practice suggestions. 81 A May
2019 report from Georgetown Law’s Center on Privacy &

Cong. 4 (2019) (statement of Kimberly J. Del Greco, Deputy Assistant Director,
Criminal Justice Information Services, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter
Del Greco Hearing Statement].
76. See Clare Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed
Data, GEORGETOWN L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019),
https://www.flawedfacedata.com/ [perma.cc/99ZP-SSY9].
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T JUST., FACE
RECOGNITION POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEMPLATE 3 (2017) [hereinafter BJA
TEMPLATE] (“[FRT] is not being used as an all-knowing big brother that keeps track
of an individual’s weekly—or daily—trips to a business. More accurately, it is a lead
generator for law enforcement to investigate criminal activity, akin to a more reliable
eye witness [sic].”).
79. See Garvie, supra note 76 (“[A]n official for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), which runs its own face recognition system, has indicated that
the agency plans to do away with the ‘investigative lead only’ limitation altogether.
At a conference in 2018, FBI Section Chief for Biometric Services Bill McKinsey said
of the FBI: ‘We’re pretty confident we’re going to have face [recognition] at positive
ID in two to three years.’”).
80. Shirin Ghaffary, How to Avoid a Dystopian Future of Facial Recognition in
Law Enforcement, VOX: RECODE (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.vox.com/
recode/2019/12/10/20996085/ai-facial-recognition-police-law-enforcement-regulation
[perma.cc/U4ZH-FV8V] (“[A public information officer at the Washington County,
Oregon Police Department] told Recode that officers only use the [facial recognition]
tools when there’s probable cause that someone has committed a crime, and only
matches it to jail booking photos, not DMV databases. (This sets Washington County
apart—several other police departments in the US do use DMV databases for facial
recognition searches.) He also said the department doesn’t use Rekognition to police
large crowds, which police in Orlando, Florida, tried to do—and failed to do
effectively, after running into technical difficulties and sustained public criticism.”).
81. See Bryan Menegus, Defense of Amazon’s Face Recognition Tool Undermined
by
Its
Only
Known
Police
Client,
GIZMODO
(Jan.
31,
2019),
https://gizmodo.com/defense-of-amazons-face-recognition-tool-undermined-by1832238149 [perma.cc/K568-CGB7].
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Technology expressed concern with the NYPD’s FRT practices.82
The report found that NYPD officers would enter “probe photos” of
suspects into their FRT program and then pursue the people their
system listed as potential suspects.83 These “probe photos” included
composite drawings as well as “a suspect’s celebrity
doppelgänger.”84 In addition, when NYPD officers received a subpar image of a suspect from surveillance footage or a witness’s
camera, they would modify the picture in order to bring it closer to
the style common in mugshots by inserting open eyes, mirroring a
partial face to make it full, or substituting other identity points.85
Georgetown researchers found these procedures to greatly diminish
the validity of any inquiry list produced by the NYPD’s FRT.86
During the summer of 2020, news outlets reported the first
documented wrongful arrests caused by FRT. Two Black men from
Michigan, Robert Williams87 and Michael Oliver,88 both suffered
82. Garvie, supra note 76 (criticizing NYPD’s facial recognition practices
involving “probe photos” and photo edits that “amount to the fabrication of facial
identity points”).
83. Id. (“There are no rules when it comes to what images police can submit to
face recognition algorithms to generate investigative leads. As a consequence,
agencies across the country can—and do—submit all manner of ‘probe photos,’
photos of unknown individuals submitted for search against a police or driver license
database.”).
84. Id. (“One detective from the Facial Identification Section (FIS), responsible
for conducting face recognition searches for the NYPD, noted that the suspect looked
like the actor Woody Harrelson, known for his performances in Cheers, Natural Born
Killers, True Detective, and other television shows and movies. A Google image
search for the actor predictably returned high-quality images, which detectives then
submitted to the face recognition algorithm in place of the suspect’s photo. In the
resulting list of possible candidates, the detectives identified someone they believed
was a match—not to Harrelson but to the suspect whose photo had produced no
possible hits.”).
85. Id. (“Editing photos before submitting them for search is common
practice . . . . One technique that the NYPD uses involves replacing facial features
or expressions in a probe photo with ones that more closely resemble those in
mugshots—collected from photos of other people.”).
86. Id. (finding that common FRT procedures reflect “at best an attempt to create
information that isn’t there in the first place and at worst the introduction of
evidence that matches someone other than the person being searched for.”).
87. Paresh Dave, Facial Recognition Leads to First Wrongful U.S. Arrest
Activists Say, REUTERS (June 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/usmichigan-facial-recognition/face-recognition-vendor-vows-new-rules-after-wrongfularrest-in-u-s-using-its-technology-idUSKBN23V1KJ [https://perma.cc/A88U-5KC7]
(“Robert Williams, who is Black, spent over a day in Detroit police custody in January
after Rank One’s face recognition software connected his driver’s license photo to
surveillance video of someone shoplifting, the American Civil Liberties Union of
Michigan (ACLU) said. . . . In a video shared by ACLU, Williams says officers
released him after acknowledging ‘the computer’ must have been wrong.”).
88. Kris Holt, Facial Recognition Linked to a Second Wrongful Arrest by Detroit
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from flawed investigations. In each case, Detroit Police ran blurry
surveillance footage through their department’s FRT, then showed
the generated lineup to a witness of the offense.89 Upon minimal
examination, it should have been clear these men were
misidentified. Michael Oliver, who has extensive tattoos on his neck
and arms, noted the surveillance footage which led to his arrest
“looked nothing like” him and the actual offender “didn’t even have
tattoos.”90 Robert Williams—who was arrested in front of his wife
and their young daughters in his driveway—stated he felt “empty”
and “humiliated” by the experience.91 After Robert Williams case
came to light, Detroit Police Chief James Craig admitted their FRT
system is heavily flawed.92 Chief Craig noted at a public meeting
that “[i]f we were just to use the technology by itself, to identify
someone, I would say 96 percent of the time it would misidentify.”93
It is unclear at this time how many cases like Robert Williams’ and
Michael Oliver’s have gone unreported.
Like any law enforcement tool or tactic, FRT comes with a
substantial list of inspiring prospects and concerning potentials.
FRT can revolutionize how law enforcement identifies and locates
suspects, but its implementation needs to follow proper procedures
Police, ENGADGET (July 10, 2020), https://www.engadget.com/facial-recognitionfalse-match-wrongful-arrest-224053761.html
[https://perma.cc/VJ9C-FLX3]
(“[P]olice in the city arrested a man for allegedly reaching into a person’s car, taking
their phone and throwing it, breaking the case and damaging the screen in the
process. Facial recognition flagged Michael Oliver as a possible suspect, and the
victim identified him in a photo lineup as the person who damaged their phone.
Oliver was charged with a felony count of larceny over the May 2019 incident. He
said he didn’t commit the crime and the evidence supported his claim.”).
89. Id.; Paresh Dave, supra note 87.
90. Elaisha Stokes, Wrongful Arrest Exposes Racial Bias in Facial Recognition
Technology, CBS NEWS (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/detroitfacial-recognition-surveillance-camera-racial-bias-crime/
[https://perma.cc/7HA5TZKP].
91. Ahiza García-Hodges, Chiara Sottile & Jacob Ward, Man Wrongfully
Arrested Due to Facial Recognition Software Talks About ‘Humiliating’ Experience,
NBC NEWS (June 26, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/manwrongfully-arrested-due-facial-recognition-software-talks-about-humiliatingn1232184 [https://perma.cc/25KF-6Q7H] (“Their oldest daughter nearly started
hyperventilating and couldn’t do her homework without getting emotional since her
dad usually helps her with it. The couple also said they’ll never forget how Williams
missed a small but important milestone while in police custody. ‘I wasn't there for
her first tooth,’ Williams said. ‘Even though it was one day, I still missed a milestone
in her life.’”).
92. Jason Koebler, Detroit Police Chief: Facial Recognition Software
Misidentifies 96% of the Time, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (June 29, 2020),
https://www.vice.com/en/
article/dyzykz/detroit-police-chief-facial-recognition-software-misidentifies-96-ofthe-time [https://perma.cc/XH55-4JY2].
93. Id.
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to ensure effective results and avoid misuse. Although some law
enforcement agencies have done a satisfactory job of self-regulating
their FRT use, it is critical to consider what formal legal approaches
can moderate law enforcement use of FRT, especially considering
FRT’s tendency to harbor algorithmic bias.
Part III: Limits to Law Enforcement Use of FRT and
Algorithmic Bias from the Constitution and Existing
Civil Rights Statutes
A. Fourth Amendment Protections from Unreasonable
Arrest
The Supreme Court recently determined that novel forms of
technology may require long-running constitutional doctrines to
adapt to circumstances once unimaginable.94 The Fourth
Amendment, which has been one of the primary ways to regulate
police action,95 has had to adapt to modern expectations of privacy
and novel methods of police intrusion into those expectations of
privacy.96 Although the Court has made some progress, many
scholars have expressed dissatisfaction with the pace at which the
Court is choosing to adapt the Fourth Amendment to the realities
of technology in modern life.97 Based on the novelty of law
94. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (uprooting the
long-held presumption that defendants forfeit all of their Fourth Amendment
privacy interests when they turn over material to a third party).
95. Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109,
116 (2017).
96. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (distinguishing
electronic devices from other objects for purposes of the search incident to arrest
warrant exception); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)) (“GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations . . . . And because GPS monitoring is cheap in
comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”); Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of advanced
technology to examine the internal affairs of a residence constitutes a search under
the Fourth Amendment and stating “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree
of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected
by the advance of technology . . . . The question we confront today is what limits
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy”).
97. See Eli R. Shindelman, Time for the Court to Become “Intimate” with
Surveillance Technology, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1909, 1911–12 (2011) (“These
advancements in surveillance technology have far outpaced the evolution of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Many scholars have argued that the current state of
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enforcement’s use of FRT, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court
has yet to tackle the issue of whether, or how, Fourth Amendment
protections limit law enforcement’s use of FRT as of the writing of
this Note.98
Due to the current lack of precedent, scholars are left to
speculate as to whether an FRT scan constitutes a search in
accordance with the Fourth Amendment.99 Less attention has been
given to FRT’s role in establishing grounds for an arrest. As stated
above, the FBI currently holds that FRT identification can only be
used as an “investigative lead.”100 However, with law enforcement’s
growing confidence in FRT, the question of whether an FRT
identification could reach the level of probable cause to support a
lawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment will likely soon arise.
Probable cause has been described as a “fluid concept—
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts”101 and thus requires the “totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis” in each individual case.102 Because law enforcement
agencies have compared FRT matches to “a more reliable eye
witness,”103 it is useful to compare FRT matches to eyewitness or
informant testimony. In the context of police informants, officers
must show there are sufficient “indicia of reliability” to trust the
testimony of an informant.104 While an anonymous tip must be
supported by facts that can be corroborated, the testimony of a
credible informant—who had provided officers with information in
the past—can be enough to independently establish probable
cause.105 With this said, the weight of an FRT match toward a

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence lacks a genuine understanding of privacy given
the realities of modern technology. These scholars argue that because there has been
widespread development in forms of technology that are capable of impinging on a
person’s privacy, courts must interpret the Fourth Amendment broadly to
adequately protect individual liberty.”).
98. See Katelyn Ringrose, Law Enforcement’s Pairing of Facial Recognition
Technology with Body-Worn Cameras Escalates Privacy Concerns, 105 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 57, 64 (2019).
99. See Kelly Blount, Body Worn Cameras with Facial Recognition Technology:
When It Constitutes a Search, 3 CRIM. L. PRAC., Fall 2017, at 61. See generally
Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1591
(2017).
100. Del Greco Hearing Statement, supra note 75, at 4.
101. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
102. Id. at 238–39.
103. BJA TEMPLATE, supra note 78, at 3.
104. Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000).
105. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972).
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probable cause determination will rest on whether judges believe
FRT is sufficiently reliable to justify a showing of probable cause. 106
In determining the perceived reliability of FRT, an analogy
between FRT matches and DNA matches is appropriate because
both are founded in biometric identification.107 The reliability of all
DNA matches was widely contested until courts began allowing for
judicial notice of DNA’s reliability.108 This holding allowed courts to
assume DNA matches are accurate enough to be admissible as long
as the expert properly performed the techniques involved in
analyzing a specific DNA specimen.109 In the coming years, FRT
matches could progress from being treated in the same way as an
eyewitness identification to being seen more like DNA evidence—as
inherently reliable absent proof of technical mistakes. However, an
important component of courts extending judicial notice to DNA
matches’ reliability was the near unanimous acceptance of the
genetic theories underlying DNA analysis by the relevant scientific
community.110 Currently, there is not a unanimous scientific
consensus supporting the validity of FRT due to continuing
concerns of algorithmic bias and general efficiency.111 Therefore, the
prospect of informed judicial notice of FRT seems unlikely at the
current time. As FRT advances it should be met with the same, if
not more, skepticism than DNA evidence underwent during its
infancy.112
106. Cf. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 799–800 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that DNA profiling evidence can be reliable enough for a court to take judicial notice).
107. See LYNCH, supra note 56, at 4 (listing “face recognition” and “DNA” as
examples of biometric identification that are becoming more popular).
108. See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 799–800 (“[I]t appears that in future cases with a
similar evidentiary issue, a court could properly take judicial notice of the general
acceptability of the general theory and the use of these specific [DNA analysis]
techniques . . . . Beyond such judicial notice, the threshold for admissibility should
require only a preliminary showing of reliability of the particular data to be offered,
i.e., some indication of how the laboratory work was done and what analysis and
assumptions underlie the probability calculations.”) (citation omitted).
109. See id.
110. Id. at 799 (“[T]he general theories of genetics which support DNA profiling
are unanimously accepted within the scientific community.”).
111. See, e.g., Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 14, at 3 (discussing research
covering “[f]ace detection and classification algorithms” used by law enforcement
that indicates lower accuracy “for people labeled female, Black, or between the ages
of 18–30 than for other demographic cohorts”).
112. Cf. Tracy & Morgan, supra note 59, at 636, 638 (“[T]he current proliferation
of DNA databases and their likely further expansion raise three significant policy
issues and attendant questions. First, how do we utilize this new technology, while
protecting against misuse and abuse? . . . Although technology makes certain
advances possible, are these advances truly necessary? . . . [W]ill DNA databases
provide law enforcement and the subsequent criminal prosecutions with measurable
and significant effects on crime?”).
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The Fourth Amendment has typically not been a respite for
those concerned with discriminatory policies.113 Invasions of privacy
or seizures of one’s person or belongings that comply with probable
cause but are based on discriminatory intent are not considered
violations of the Fourth Amendment.114 The Court has determined
the subjective, potentially discriminatory, intent of an arresting
officer plays no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment
analysis.115 The constitutional basis for objecting to law
enforcement’s intentionally discriminatory application of laws is
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment.116 It is unclear how precisely the Fourth
Amendment would be applied to unintentional discriminatory
actions related to programs controlled by algorithmic bias, but it is
most likely that algorithmic bias would influence the determination
of whether probable cause is actually present in a given case.
B. Equal Protection Clause as a Response to Algorithmic
Bias
It is worth considering how the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment could remedy concerns of algorithmic bias.
Plaintiffs pursuing a race-based117 Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause claim against the government have one of two
routes to prevail on their claim.118 The first route requires the
contested government policy to contain an explicit racial
113. See Jonathan P. Feingold, Equal Protection Design Defects, 91 TEMP. L. REV.
513, 516 (2019).
114. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
115. Id. (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 138 (1978) (referencing
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973))) (“[W]e said that ‘subjective
intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.’
We described Robinson as having established that ‘the fact that the officer does not
have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal
justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.’ We think these cases foreclose
any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the
actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”).
116. Id. (“We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws
is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”).
117. Feingold, supra note 113. This article uses race-based Equal Protection
Clause doctrine as an example because it is often reviewed with the strictest level of
scrutiny, as opposed to, for example, gender-based Equal Protection Clause claims
which are only reviewed with intermediate scrutiny. Therefore, race-based Equal
Protection Clause analysis provides the best potential for exploring the effectiveness
of Equal Protection claims in this area.
118. Id. at 516–17.
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classification.119 The plaintiff then must show this racial
classification does not withstand strict judicial scrutiny. 120 Strict
scrutiny means the government policy containing the racial
classification must be shown to lack either a compelling government
interest or a narrowly tailored approach to fulfilling the policy’s
governmental interest.121
The second route for an Equal Protection Clause claim
requires a plaintiff to show “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent
or purpose”122 in the adoption or maintaining of the contested
government policy.123 A plaintiff need not demonstrate
discrimination was the dominant or primary purpose of the
contested governmental policy, but a plaintiff must show
discrimination was at least a consideration of those instituting the
policy or enforcing the policy.124 The requirement of discriminatory
intent under the Equal Protection Clause means a plaintiff cannot
pursue a disparate impact claim under this Clause.125
Scholars have critiqued this bifurcated approach to the Equal
Protection Clause, which favors facial neutrality and is only
concerned with disparate treatment.126 This judicial approach has
led to many societal issues without an appropriate avenue of
recourse in the courts.127 One of the clearest examples is the wellknown sentencing disparities between crack cocaine and powder
cocaine offenses.128 Scholars have expressed further concern about
119. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Cronson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989).
120. The Court in City of Richmond found:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are
‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the
purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.
Id. at 493.
121. Strict Scrutiny, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny [perma.cc/YB9Q-2QX8].
122. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977).
123. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982).
124. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
125. Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 726 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014).
126. Feingold, supra note 113.
127. Ashlee Riopka, Equal Protection Falling Through the Crack: A Critique of the
Crack-to-Powder Sentencing Disparity, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 121, 122 (2015).
128. Id. at 124, 129 (explaining that while the sentencing disparity between crack
and powder cocaine was originally 100:1 in the Anti-Drug and Abuse Act of 1986, the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 still contained a disparity of 18:1). Riopka continues:
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the Court’s presumption that “facially neutral evaluative tools
produce racially neutral results.”129 Scholars have noted that the
Equal Protection Clause is not an appropriate avenue for disparities
caused by algorithms due to the Court’s bifurcated approach solely
being concerned with disparate treatment, which requires a
showing of discriminatory intent.130
C. Civil Rights Statutes as a Response to Algorithmic Bias
in Police Systems
Civil rights statutes are often viewed as a set of tools—more
flexible than the Equal Protection Clause—that aggrieved plaintiffs
can use to seek justice. For police conduct and policy there is a
diminished set of tools available compared to discrimination in
fields like housing,131 employment,132 or public accommodations. 133
Each of these fields of discrimination, besides police conduct and
policy,134 have a simple disparate impact route for aggrieved
plaintiffs to pursue.135 Police conduct and policy, on the other hand,
are usually addressed through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 136 which allows for
civil suits against a person acting under color of law stemming from

Since the Fair Sentencing Act is facially race-neutral, its racially disparate
impact provides the most obvious evidence of an equal protection violation.
Unfortunately, defendants who rely solely on this method of proof will face
a multitude of challenges. While the Supreme Court has not specifically
invalidated disparate impact theory as a method of proving discriminatory
intent in equal protection challenges, additional hurdles make disparate
impact arguments difficult. Under the current trend of equal protection
jurisprudence, evidence of racial disparity remains constitutionally
insignificant unless it is accompanied by evidence of disparate treatment or
intentional discrimination.
Id. at 131.
129. See Feingold, supra note 113, at 528–29 (“[E]qual protection doctrine
rests on the presumption that facially neutral evaluative tools produce racially
neutral results. This presumption spans Justices and ideological
spectrums . . . . [However] decades of research on implicit bias and stereotype
threat reveals that common measures of merit, although facially neutral, fail
to produce racially neutral results.”).
130. Id. at 539–40.
131. See, e.g., David J. Frizell & Ronald D. Cucchiaro, Fair Housing Act—
Disparate Impact, 36 N.J. PRAC., LAND USE LAW § 20.28 (3d ed. 2019).
132. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—Burden of Proof; Disparate
Impact, OH. EMPL. PRAC. L. § 2:16 (2019).
133. See, e.g., B.E. Witkin, Economic Criteria and Disparate Impact, 8 WITKIN
SUM. 11TH CONST. L. § 1012 (2020).
134. See Alisa Tiwari, Disparate-Impact Liability for Policing, 129 YALE L.J. 252
(2019).
135. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).
136. Stephen R. McAllister & Peyton H. Robinson, The Potential Civil Liability of
Law Enforcement Officers and Agencies, 67 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 14, 22 (1998).
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the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws.”137
The protections extended under § 1983 are inherently linked
to other laws through the language “secured by the Constitution
and laws.”138 An aggrieved plaintiff must pinpoint a violation of
either one of their constitutional rights or a right granted by statute
to have a chance of prevailing in their § 1983 claim.139 In terms of
police use of investigative tools exhibiting algorithmic bias, there is
no clear constitutional right to which a plaintiff suing under § 1983
can point, and only a minimal chance for a statutory right. As
discussed above, in sections III(a) and III(b), the Fourth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause—the two most likely
constitutional provisions applicable to algorithmic bias—are not
appropriate means for a plaintiff suing under § 1983 in those
circumstances. With regard to statutory rights, a likely candidate
for plaintiffs to attach their § 1983 claim is Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
Title VI, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in
programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance,140
including many law enforcement organizations.141 While a private
citizen can link a civil claim through § 2000d, this base provision
“prohibits only intentional discrimination.”142 Government agencies
can promulgate regulations under § 2000d-1 that “may validly
proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups,
even though such activities are permissible under” § 2000d. 143
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court determined that private
individuals may not sue to enforce disparate-impact regulation
promulgated through § 2000d-1.144 This ruling leaves private actors
with no clear method to combat police use of investigative tools
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
138. Id.
139. Martin A. Schwartz, Introduction: Section 1983 Rights Are “Personal”, SEC.
1983 LITIG. CLAIMS & DEFENSES § 3.01 (4th ed. 2020).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
141. INIMAI CHETTIAR, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & NICOLE FORTIER, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST., REFORMING FUNDING TO REDUCE MASS I NCARCERATION 3 (2013)
(“Washington spends billions of dollars each year to subsidize state and local
criminal justice systems. Specifically, the Justice Department administers dozens of
criminal justice grants. In 2012, just some of the largest programs, including the
Community Oriented Policing Services and Violence Against Women Act grants,
received more than $1.47 billion.”).
142. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
143. Id. at 281.
144. Id. at 282.
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exhibiting algorithmic bias. Although § 2000d-1 cannot assist
private actors in their complaints, it does provide a potential course
for federal departments and agencies to regulate police use of
investigative tools exhibiting algorithmic bias through disparate
impact regulation.
Part IV: Novel Legislative Responses to Law Enforcement
Use of FRT and Algorithmic Bias
A. Moratoriums on Law Enforcement Use of FRT and
Legislators’ Expressed Concerns
Concerns about law enforcement use of FRT has led several
municipalities to pass moratoriums, or outright bans, on law
enforcement’s use of the technology to pursue suspects or monitor
crowds.145 In May 2019, San Francisco became the first U.S. city to
ban law enforcement use of FRT.146 Advocates for the ban stated
FRT “as it exists today is unreliable, and represent[s] an
unnecessary infringement on people’s privacy and liberty.”147
Additionally, advocates for the ban argued FRT is “error prone,
particularly when dealing with women or people with darker
skin.”148 The lead sponsor for a similar piece of legislation, which
passed in Somerville, Massachusetts near the end of 2019, stated
many of his constituents “are worried about the consequences of
[FRT] whose capabilities are outpacing the public’s understanding
of its power.”149 A small but growing number of cities have passed
similar bans as San Francisco and Somerville.150

145. See Nicole Martin, The Major Concerns Around Facial Recognition
Technology,
FORBES
(Sept.
25,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/
nicolemartin1/2019/09/25/the-major-concerns-around-facial-recognition-technology/
#256162984fe3 [perma.cc/BA6V-LFEL].
146. Dave Lee, San Francisco Is First US City to Ban Facial Recognition, BBC
(May 14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48276660 [perma.cc/5W6XASH4].
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Sarah Wu, Somerville City Council Passes Facial Recognition Ban, BOSTON
GLOBE (June 27, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/06/27/somervillecity-council-passes-facial-recognition-ban/SfaqQ7mG3DGulXonBH
SCYK/story.html [perma.cc/RL5E-PN9T].
150. See Nikolas DeCosta-Klipa, Cambridge Becomes the Largest Massachusetts
City to Ban Facial Recognition, BOSTON (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.boston.com/
news/local-news/2020/01/14/cambridge-facial-recognition
[perma.cc/JL76-G7Z3];
Sarah Ravani, Oakland Bans Use of Facial Recognition Technology, Citing Bias
Concerns, S.F. CHRON. (July 17, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bay
area/article/Oakland-bans-use-of-facial-recognition-14101253.php#:~:text=The#
[perma.cc/XHQ2-4CV5].
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Concern about the proliferation of FRT is a surprisingly
bipartisan issue considering our polarizing time.151 Democrats have
shown apprehension toward FRT due to FRT’s algorithmic bias. 152
Senator Cory Booker clearly expressed this concern in proposing the
“No Biometric Barriers to Housing Act” when he stated “[u]sing
facial recognition technology in public housing without fully
understanding its flaws and privacy implications seriously harms
our most vulnerable communities . . . .”153 Republicans have
concerns about government expansion, a sentiment made clear by a
spokesperson for Rep. Jim Jordan, who stated “[f]acial recognition
is concerning from the perspective of government having too much
power . . . . It’s an instinctive civil libertarian and constitutionalist
perspective.”154 These bipartisan concerns demonstrate both the
breadth of unease towards FRT as well as the real possibility of a
joint, productive legislative response to FRT at the federal level.
B. Algorithmic Accountability Laws: Bringing Machine
Bias into the Light
For many years, companies and law enforcement agencies
operated and distributed their FRT programs in a secretive way. 155
Only recently have companies and law enforcement agencies
become slightly more transparent when it comes to their
relationship and the joint use of FRT.156 A recent troubling example

151. See Shirin Ghaffary, How Facial Recognition Became the Most Feared
Technology in the US, VOX: RECODE (Aug. 9, 2019) https://www.vox.com/
recode/2019/8/9/20799022/facial-recognition-law [perma.cc/EV9E-2CCR].
152. See, e.g., Chris Mills Rodrigo, Booker Introduces Bill Banning Facial
Recognition Tech in Public Housing, THE HILL (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/468582-booker-introduces-bill-banning-facialrecognition-tech-in-public-housing [perma.cc/34UR-6DKE] (“Sen. Cory Booker (DN.J.) on Friday introduced a bill banning the use of facial recognition technology in
public housing, mirroring legislation proposed in the House in July . . . . [House
legislation was] introduced by Reps. Yvette Clarke (D-N.Y.), Ayanna Pressley (DMass.) and Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.) . . . .”).
153. Id.
154. Ghaffary, supra note 151.
155. Accord Amrita Khalid, Microsoft and Amazon Are at the Center of an ACLU
Lawsuit on Facial Recognition, QUARTZ (Nov. 4, 2019), https://qz.com/1740570/aclulawsuit-targets-amazons-rekognition-and-microsofts-azure/
[perma.cc/UWB7KBR4] (“The government has not disclosed which companies are providing these
dystopian tools to spy on the public.”).
156. Cf. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We
Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/
technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html
[perma.cc/7SL8-YWKC]
(documenting an investigation into a company that sells FRT, which at first
remained very private but eventually has been more willing to discuss their software
with journalists).
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of this secrecy, and at times overt deception, is the small tech startup called Clearview AI.157 Clearview AI devised a groundbreaking
facial recognition app, which became subject to public scrutiny in
January 2020 after the publication of a New York Times article by
technology reporter Kashmir Hill.158 Despite having limited
knowledge about how Clearview AI works or who is behind it,
hundreds of law enforcement agencies have begun using Clearview
AI.159 Clearview AI has now been shown to purposefully obfuscate
investigations into its practices and to deceive its partners.160 As
Hill was investigating Clearview AI, it became apparent that
Clearview AI was purposefully trying to inhibit her from finding
information.161 Additionally, Clearview AI has claimed that they
only intend to provide their powerful tool to law enforcement
agencies, but ample reporting has demonstrated this is untrue. 162
In response to public outcry, Clearview AI has tried to display more
transparency. One such effort included Clearview AI releasing a
study that claims they found no algorithmic bias in their system, 163
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (“Federal and state law enforcement officers said that while they had only
limited knowledge of how Clearview works and who is behind it, they had used its
app to help solve shoplifting, identity theft, credit card fraud, murder and child
sexual exploitation cases . . . . But without public scrutiny, more than 600 law
enforcement agencies have started using Clearview in the past year, according to the
company, which declined to provide a list.”).
160. Id.
161. The Daily, The End of Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, at 11:08 (Feb. 10,
2020)
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/podcasts/the-daily/facial-recognitionsurveillance.html? [perma.cc/KG6E-PJYZ] (describing how Clearview AI specifically
made it so no facial recognition matches would appear when law enforcement
searched for Kashmir Hill and that Clearview AI would call law enforcement agents
if they ran a search for her).
162. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Before Clearview Became a Police Tool, It Was a Secret
Plaything of the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/
05/technology/clearview-investors.html [perma.cc/R3KP-UL7Q] (“[F]or more than a
year before the company became the subject of public scrutiny, the app had been
freely used in the wild by the company’s investors, clients and friends. Those with
Clearview logins used facial recognition at parties, on dates and at business
gatherings, giving demonstrations of its power for fun or using it to identify people
whose names they didn’t know or couldn’t recall.”); Caroline Haskins, Ryan Mac &
Logan McDonald, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Has Been Used By the Justice
Department, ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, and the NBA, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-lawenforcement [perma.cc/K5YJ-P5YP] (“Clearview AI has also been aggressively
pursuing clients in industries such as law, retail, banking, and gaming and pushing
into international markets . . . .”).
163. Caroline Haskins, Ryan Mac & Logan McDonald, The ACLU Slammed a
Facial Recognition Company that Scrapes Photos from Instagram and Facebook,
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however some groups have taken issue with the methodology used
in these self-evaluations and call for third-party oversight.164
Cases of private companies, like Clearview AI, falsely claiming
to self-regulate have caused some lawmakers to demand more
transparency and accountability for the implementation of
increasingly common algorithmic systems.165 One method of
legislating the AI field is the use of “Algorithmic Impact
Statements,” similar to environmental impact statements, which
demand private organizations and government agencies to selfevaluate the efficacy and potential discriminatory effects of their
algorithms.166 In April 2019, three members of Congress proposed
the first federal legislation following the Algorithmic Impact
Statement Model.167 Their bill, titled the Algorithmic
Accountability Bill of 2019, would authorize the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to create regulations requiring companies under
its jurisdiction to conduct impact assessments of highly sensitive
automated decision systems.168 In supporting the bill,
Representative Yvette D. Clark stated that “[a]lgorithms shouldn’t
have an exemption from our anti-discrimination laws. Our bill
recognizes that algorithms have authors, and without diligent
oversight, they can reflect the biases of those behind the
keyboard.”169
The Algorithmic Accountability Bill of 2019 would only cover
private companies through the FTC’s oversight capacity,170 but
subsequent legislation has been introduced to address government
use of algorithms. One example in the field of law enforcement is
Representative Mark Takano’s Justice in Forensic Algorithms
Act.171 In expressing concern for criminal defendants’ due process
rights, Representative Takano has stated:
Forensic algorithms are black boxes, and we need to be able to
look inside to understand how the software works and to give
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(Feb.
10,
2020),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/carolinehaskins1/clearview-ai-facial-recognition-accurate-aclu-absurd
[perma.cc/4LFB-4SD9].
164. Id.
165. See Press Release, U.S. Sen. Cory Booker of N.J., Booker, Wyden, Clarke
Introduce Bill Requiring Companies to Target Bias in Corporate Algorithms (Apr.
10, 2019), https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=903 [perma.cc/
U8XT-35GU].
166. Selbst, supra note 95, at 110.
167. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Cory Booker, supra note 165.
168. Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019).
169. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Cory Booker, supra note 165.
170. Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019).
171. Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act of 2019, H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019).
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defendants the ability to challenge them. My legislation will
open the black box of forensic algorithms and establish
standards that will safeguard our Constitutional right to a fair
trial.172

Notably, the Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act would amend the
Federal Rules of Evidence to prohibit the use of trade secret
privileges to prevent defendants from accessing algorithms used in
their prosecution.173 The Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act would
also direct NIST to establish Computational Forensic Algorithms
Standards and a Computational Forensic Algorithms Testing
Program.174 In developing these standards, NIST would be directed
to consider a variety of factors including algorithms’ potential for
disparate impact across protected classes in standards and
testing.175 After NIST establishes their standards, federal law
enforcement would then be required to follow them.176 These pieces

172. Press Release, U.S. Congressman Mark Takano of Cal.’s 41st Dist., Rep.
Takano Introduces the Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act to Protect Defendants’
Due Process Rights in the Criminal Justice System (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://takano.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/rep-takano-introduces-thejustice-in-forensic-algorithms-act-to-protect-defendants-due-process-rights-in-thecriminal-justice-system [perma.cc/K38E-32MN].
173. The bill provides:
In any criminal case, evidence that is the result of analysis by computational
forensic software is admissible only if—
(1) the computational forensic software used has been submitted to the
Computational Forensic Algorithm Testing Program of the Director of
the National Institute of Standards and Technology and there have
been no material changes to that software since it was last tested; and
(2) the developers and users of the computational forensic software
agree to waive any and all legal claims against the defense or any
member of its team for the purposes of the defense analyzing or testing
the computational forensic software.
Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act of 2019, H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019).
174. Press Release, U.S. Congressman Mark Takano, supra note 172.
175. Id. (“In developing standards NIST is directed to: collaborate with outside
experts in forensic science, bioethics, algorithmic discrimination, data privacy, racial
justice, criminal justice reform, exonerations, and other relevant areas of expertise
identified through public input; address the potential for disparate impact across
protected classes in standards and testing; and gather public input for the
development of the standards and testing program and publicly document the
resulting standards and testing of software.”).
176. Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act of 2019, H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019)
(“Any Federal law enforcement agency or crime laboratory providing services to a
Federal agency using computational forensic software may use only software that
has been tested under the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s
Computational Forensic Algorithm Testing Program and shall conduct an internal
validation according to the requirements outlined in the Computational Forensic
Algorithm Standards and make the results publicly available. The internal
validation shall be updated when there is a material change in the software that
triggers a retesting by the Computational Forensic Algorithm Testing Program.”).
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of proposed legislation allow for some degree of oversight, but as of
the writing of this Note it is unclear if they will actually become law.
C. Legislative Suggestions from Scholars on FRT and
Algorithmic Bias
University-affiliated experts177 and non-profit groups178 have
drafted model legislation calling for a variety of reforms related to
the use of algorithms generally and specifically as they apply to
FRT. Clare Garvie, a senior associate at the Georgetown University
Center on Privacy and Technology, believes a moratorium on the
use of FRT should be put in place until FRT regulations are passed
requiring “minimum photo quality standards, accuracy testing, and
publicly available reports . . . on how the government uses facial
recognition tech.”179 Garvie further calls for a private right of action
if law enforcement did not follow these best practices.180 In addition
to suggesting formal legislation, Garvie also provided a list of thirty
recommendations for a variety of actors involved in the production,
utilization, and potential regulation of FRT.181 Of note, Garvie
recommended that NIST “[r]egularly include tests for algorithmic
bias along the lines of race, gender, and age in facial recognition
competitions,” along with four other recommendations for NIST. 182
Kartik Hosanagar, a University of Pennsylvania technology
professor, takes a more expansive view on algorithmic
accountability. Hosanagar proposes an “Algorithmic Bill of Rights”
to manage the many risks and benefits that come with continued
proliferation of algorithms in the United States’ most vital
177. GARVIE ET AL., supra note 17, at 102–19.
178. Community Control over Police Surveillance, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/
issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/community-control-over-policesurveillance?redirect=feature/community-control-over-police-surveillance
[perma.cc/5UJV-5H33].
179. Khari Johnson, Facial Recognition Regulation Is Surprisingly Bipartisan,
VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 11, 2019), https://venturebeat.com/2019/11/11/facialrecognition-regulation-is-surprisingly-bipartisan/ [perma.cc/7NQB-X9JG].
180. GARVIE ET AL., supra note 17, at 114 (“Any person who is subject to targeted
identification or attempted identification through targeted continuous face
recognition in violation of this Act may in a civil action recover from the [state]
investigative or law enforcement officer or the state or [federal law] enforcement
agency which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.”)
(alterations in original).
181. Id. at 62–71.
182. See also id. (“Recommendation 24: Increase the frequency of face recognition
competitions, ideally testing on an annual or biennial basis . . . . Recommendation
25: Continue to update tests to reflect state-of-the-art advances in face recognition
and mobile biometrics . . . . Recommendation 26: Develop tests that closely mirror
law enforcement workflows, and issue best practices for accuracy testing . . . .
Recommendation 27: Develop and distribute diverse datasets of photos.”).
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systems.183 Sigal Samuel from Vox News spoke with ten experts in
the field of AI, including Kartik Hosanagar and Joy Buolamwini,184
to compose a formal list of ten rights Americans would have under
an “Algorithmic Bill of Rights.”185 This composite of rights echoes
the themes of transparency and redress emphasized in the proposed
Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019 and the Justice in Forensic
Algorithms Act of 2019. Two specific rights proposed—“Freedom
from Bias”186 and “Independent Oversight”187—are critical to the
management of algorithmic bias and FRT. The two rights would
ensure algorithms were regularly tested for bias and that the tests
were performed by third-party organizations in real-world
situations.188 This collaborative list from a variety of concerned
experts in the field of AI could provide legislators with a substantial
framework for future legislative proposals.
Part V: Finding the Balance Between Investigative
Advancements and Civil Liberties
Like forensic DNA before it, FRT will revolutionize law
enforcement’s investigative effectiveness.189 Law enforcement’s
increased capacity to identify, and potentially locate, suspects with
only a photo or a still image from a video is expected to lead to an
increase in the apprehension of evasive criminals,190 prevention of

183. KARTIK HOSANAGAR, A HUMAN’S GUIDE TO MACHINE INTELLIGENCE: HOW
ALGORITHMS ARE SHAPING OUR LIVES AND HOW WE CAN STAY IN CONTROL 218
(2019).
184. See generally Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 14.
185. Sigal Samuel, 10 Things We Should All Demand from Big Tech Right Now,
VOX (May 29, 2019), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/5/22/18273284/aialgorithmic-bill-of-rights-accountability-transparency-consent-bias [https://web.
archive.org/web/20201107235745/https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/5/22/
18273284/ai-algorithmic-bill-of-rights-accountability-transparency-consent-bias].
186. Id. (“We have the right to evidence showing that algorithms have been tested
for bias related to race, gender, and other protected characteristics — before they’re
rolled out. The algorithms must meet standards of fairness and nondiscrimination
and ensure just outcomes.”).
187. Id. (“We have the right to expect that an independent oversight body will be
appointed to conduct retrospective reviews of algorithmic systems gone wrong. The
results of these investigations should be made public.”).
188. Id. (“Eric Topol, a physician and the author of Deep Medicine, told me too
many algorithms are validated only on computers, not in real-world clinical
environments. ‘We have already learned that there is a chasm between the accuracy
of an algorithm, especially determined this way, and a favorable impact on clinical
outcomes’ he said, explaining that just because an algorithm appears to work great
in a computer simulation doesn’t mean it’ll work as intended in all doctors’ offices.”).
189. Tracy & Morgan, supra note 59.
190. O’Neill, supra note 67.
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acts of mass violence,191 and recovery of victims of human
trafficking.192 As with most law enforcement processes, the express
intent of law enforcement’s increased reliance on FRT is to protect
our society and achieve a feeling of justice for the victims of criminal
behavior.193 However, these intended objectives need to be
reconciled with the fact that powerful police efforts often affect
historically marginalized communities more than others. 194
Although law enforcement may have the best of intentions, human

191. Ivan Moreno, AI-Powered Cameras Become New Tool Against Mass
Shootings, ABC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wire
Story/threat-mass-shootings-give-rise-ai-powered-cameras-65285382 [perma.cc/P2
CC-T35E] (“There was no threat, but Hildreth’s demonstration showed what’s
possible with AI-powered cameras. If a gunman were in one of his schools, the
cameras could quickly identify the shooter’s location and movements, allowing police
to end the threat as soon as possible, said Hildreth, emergency operations
coordinator for the Fulton County School District. AI is transforming surveillance
cameras from passive sentries into active observers that can identify people,
suspicious behavior and guns, amassing large amounts of data that help them learn
over time to recognize mannerisms, gait and dress. If the cameras have a previously
captured image of someone who is banned from a building, the system can
immediately alert officials if the person returns. At a time when the threat of a mass
shooting is ever-present, schools are among the most enthusiastic adopters of the
technology . . . .”).
192. Tom Simonite, How Facial Recognition Is Fighting Child Sex Trafficking,
WIRED (June 19, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/how-facial-recognitionfighting-child-sex-trafficking/ [perma.cc/NTN6-JTYZ] (“One evening in April, a
California law enforcement officer was browsing Facebook when she saw a post
from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children with a picture of a
missing child. The officer took a screenshot of the image, which she later fed into
a tool created by nonprofit Thorn to help investigators find underage sextrafficking victims. The tool, called Spotlight, uses text- and image-processing
algorithms to match faces and other clues in online sex ads with other evidence.
Using Amazon’s facial recognition technology, Spotlight quickly returned a list of
online sex ads featuring the girl’s photo. She had been sold for weeks. The ads set
in motion some more traditional police work. ‘Within weeks that child was
recovered and removed from trauma,’ Julie Cordua, CEO of Thorn, said,
recounting the case at an Amazon conference in Las Vegas this month.”).
193. O’Neill, supra note 67.
194. Selbst, supra note 95 at 119–20 (“Police act with incredible discretion. They
choose where to focus their attention, who to arrest, and when to use force. They
make many choices every day regarding who is a suspect and who appears to be a
criminal. Examined in the
aggregate,
all
of
those
choices
exhibit
disproportionate impacts on poor people and people of color. This is the result of bias
built into policing as an institution, as well as unconscious biases of individual police
officers. Thus, where police use predictive policing technology, the purpose is not
only to detect hidden patterns, but also to inject a ‘neutral,’ data-driven tool into the
process to prevent unconscious police biases from entering the equation.
Predictive policing promises both to provide auditable methods that will prevent
invidious intentional discrimination and to mitigate the unconscious biases
attending police officers’ daily choices. But at the moment, such a promise amounts
to little more than a useful sales tactic.”).
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implicit bias, and now algorithmic bias, can result in atrocious
disparities and mistreatment.195
The Equal Protections Clause’s jurisprudence, as it currently
stands, is not designed to remedy the modern problem of police use
of systems containing algorithmic bias. The requirement to prove
discriminatory intent under the Equal Protection Clause makes it
difficult to apply to a seemingly unintended and unexpected source
of discrimination, namely algorithmic bias.196 The misleading
perception that machines are inherently objective and “infallible” 197
further complicates this issue and may actually conceal
discriminatory human intent behind mechanical objectivity.198
The Fourth Amendment also does not appear to be a likely
avenue to address algorithmic bias. The Court’s decision in Whren
v. United States makes it clear that the Fourth Amendment’s
probable cause analysis should not factor in an officer’s subjective
intent.199 The Court’s ruling in Whren makes it appear that
discriminatory undertones have no role in determining the presence
of a Fourth Amendment violation.200 However, algorithmic bias may
affect the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause analysis by drawing
into question the reliability of FRT matches in meeting the
necessary standard of proof.201 Police use of FRT matches could be
compared to the police consulting with an informant known to be
unreliable.202 However, because the Fourth Amendment’s probable
cause analysis is so flexible, it is unlikely judges will find an FRT
match, combined with other minor information, does not reach the
level of probable cause, even given FRT’s algorithmic bias.203
Legislative or agency action is the most fitting way to address
the quickly evolving prospects associated with law enforcement’s
increased use of FRT because of the adaptive approach these routes
can provide. Constitutional solutions, even if they were viable, may
be too rigid to appropriately balance the nuanced and ever-changing

195. Id.
196. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–
65 (1977) (noting that Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), has been repeatedly
relied on to reaffirm the need for “proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose”
in a variety of contexts).
197. Desai & Kroll, supra note 20.
198. See Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 14.
199. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
200. Id.
201. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (discussing the standard of
proof for finding probable cause).
202. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000).
203. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 232.
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interests at play with law enforcement’s use of FRT. 204 The Court
has admitted when discussing the canon of constitutional avoidance
that settling an issue through a constitutional decision can limit
legislative flexibility.205 Additionally, if the legislature assigned
regulatory power to an executive agency, as proposed in the
Algorithmic Accountability Bill of 2019206 or the Justice in Forensic
Algorithms Bill of 2019,207 then the assigned agency could use its
expertise to generate fitting responses to advancements in
technology and investigative tactics.208
Specifically, NIST must have the authority to set clear
standards about algorithmic bias and FRT specifically, which
federal law enforcement and local law enforcement receiving federal
funds would be required to follow. It is in the best interest of the
United States for Congress to follow the suggestions of
Representative Mark Takano209 and Clare Garvie210 in assigning
power to NIST. As algorithms proliferate in American society, and
more concerningly, the criminal justice system, there needs to be a
central regulator that guides these rapid advancements. NIST has
made some advancements in this role through studies like the
Facial Recognition Vendor Test, which showed the majority of FRT
programs exhibit bias.211 However, NIST needs greater authority to
act on these sorts of findings. For example, NIST should be able to:
(1) mandate federal law enforcement to use those FRT programs
that exhibit the lowest demographically-based error rate;212 (2)
draft strict protocol outlining best practices for law enforcement use
of FRT;213 (3) perform regular audits of law enforcement use of
FRT;214 and (4) require law enforcement agencies to be transparent

204. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 508–09 (1979) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
205. See id. at 509 (quoting Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926))
(“[A]mendment may not be substituted for construction, and that a court may not
exercise legislative functions to save [a] law from conflict with constitutional
limitation.”).
206. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Cory Booker, supra note 165.
207. Press Release, U.S. Congressman Mark Takano, supra note 172.
208. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and
Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429 (Spring 1999).
209. Press Release, U.S. Congressman Mark Takano, supra note 172.
210. GARVIE ET AL., supra notes 17, 180–182.
211. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 43 (finding bias in the form of demographic
differentials in contemporary face recognition algorithms).
212. See id.
213. GARVIE ET AL., supra note 17.
214. Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act of 2019, H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019).
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in their use of FRT and their partnerships with manufacturers. 215
NIST could also use 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 to establish regulations
that would allow NIST to enforce disparate impact theories related
to FRT. Until this sort of authority is given to a responsible
government agency or the legislature imposes some clear regulatory
system, we are left hoping that FRT companies and law
enforcement behave themselves,216 because existing legal
frameworks are not suitable to this new wave of invasive
discrimination.217
Conclusion
Law and technology have always been engaged in a cat and
mouse chase, with law unsuccessfully trying to catch up to
advancements in technology. FRT and algorithmic bias are some of
the most recent examples of technology evolving just outside the
reach of judicial precedent. The more adaptive portions of
government, namely the legislature and government agencies, need
to work towards creating a comprehensive framework to deal with
FRT and algorithmic bias before the proliferation of these systems
reaches a critical mass. There are examples worldwide of countries

215. Samuel, supra note 185 (“We have the right to know when an algorithm is
making a decision about us, which factors are being considered by the algorithm, and
how those factors are being weighted.”).
216 Compare Isobel Asher Hamilton, Outrage over Police Brutality has Finally
Convinced Amazon, Microsoft, and IBM to Rule Out Selling Facial Recognition Tech
to Law Enforcement. Here’s What’s Going On, BUS. INSIDER (June 13, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-microsoft-ibm-halt-selling-facialrecognition-to-police-2020-6 [https://perma.cc/WYJ4-8JNQ] (“Three of the world's
biggest tech companies have backed off selling facial recognition to law enforcement
amid ongoing protests against police brutality.”), with Julia Horowitz, Tech
Companies Are Still Helping Police Scan Your Face, CNN BUS. (July 3, 2020)
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/03/tech/facial-recognition-police/index.html#:~:text=
Tech%20companies%20are%20still%20helping%20police%20scan%20your%20face
&text=As%20Black%20Lives%20Matter%20protests [https://perma.cc/DAS2-A62R]
(“[IBM, Amazon, and Microsoft] aren't the top suppliers of facial recognition software
used by law enforcement, meaning police departments will still be able to buy from
plenty of vendors. Clearview AI, Japan's NEC and Ayonix, Germany's Cognitec and
Australia's iOmniscient have all said they intend to maintain their relationships
with US police forces.”).
217 Hamilton supra note 216 (“‘From a US perspective, these announcements confirm
the serious harm that unregulated facial recognition technology in the hands of law
enforcement has already caused Black and other [minority] groups to suffer’ . . . [Dr.
Nakeema Stefflbauer] added: ‘In my opinion, this is the moment when US and EU
governments must take technology regulation seriously and pass comprehensive
legislation: failure to do so is nothing less than giving permission for an unchecked
assault on human rights.’”).
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already using FRT at a near dystopian level.218 In the United States,
we need to cultivate an adaptive legal framework before FRT, and
its underlying algorithmic bias, get further out of hand. 219 Proactive
solutions, like the proposed and model legislation described above,
must be instituted to reduce the gap between legal theory and
technological realities.

218. Emily Feng, How China Is Using Facial Recognition Technology, NPR (Dec.
16, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/16/788597818/how-china-is-using-facialrecognition-technology [perma.cc/QN64-P2PB] (“In the dataset Wethington found,
people were indexed by information, like their criminal history, with facial
recognition data, like if they were bearded or wearing a mask, and even what
ethnicity they were, Han, the ethnic majority here in China, or Uighur, a
predominantly Muslim ethnic minority China has detained by the hundreds of
thousands in the region of Xinjiang in the name of anti-terrorism.”); Kelvin Chan,
UK Police Use of Facial Recognition Tests Public’s Tolerance, ABC NEWS (Jan. 16,
2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/uk-police-facial-recognitiontests-publics-tolerance-68321764 [perma.cc/BD28-5PJD] (“Police in Britain are
testing the real-time use of facial recognition to scan crowds for wanted people and
then detain any suspects for questioning. . . . The real-time surveillance being tested
in Britain is among the more aggressive uses of facial recognition in Western
democracies and raises questions about how the technology will enter people’s daily
lives.”); Laura Mackenzie, Surveillance State: How Gulf Governments Keep Watch on
Us, WIRED (Jan. 21, 2020), https://wired.me/technology/privacy/surveillance-gulfstates/ [perma.cc/49XE-JXX5] (“[Dubai] police have been rolling out a program called
Oyoon (Eyes) that implements facial recognition technology and analysis across the
city. They basically have thousands of video feeds from cameras across the emirate
that feed back into a central command center.”).
219. Lane Brown, There Will Be No Turning Back on Facial Recognition, N.Y.
MAG: INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 12, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/11/thefuture-of-facial-recognition-in-america.html [perma.cc/WH3Z-W35Z] (“We also
heard that spooked lawmakers banned police use of facial recognition
in Oakland; Berkeley; Somerville, Massachusetts; and San Francisco, of all places,
where Orwellian tech products are the hometown industry. But everywhere else and
in all other contexts, facial recognition is legal and almost completely unregulated—
and we heard that it’s already being used on us in city streets, airports, retail
stores, restaurants, hotels, sporting events, churches, and presumably lots of other
places we just don’t know about.”).

